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INVERSE CONDEMNATION IN WASHINGTON-
IS THE LID OFF PANDORA'S BOX?
Improvements and innovations designed to meet modern-day re-
quirements of mass public transportation have spawned a number of
legal problems, many of which the courts have attempted to resolve
under an expanding concept of eminent domain.' This ancient power,
by which a sovereign may appropriate private property to public use,
has not been a static doctrine. Rather it has served as an umbrella
under which a multitude of varied and intricate theories, rules, and
limitations have been developed by the judiciary to keep up with the
increasing complexities of governmental functions and responsibilities.
In Washington it may well be that modern transportation, by virtue
of a single recent case, has generated a considerable extension of
eminent domain under the title of inverse condemnation.2
The 1964 decision in Martin v. Port of Seattle,3 appears to have
abrogated a sizable segment of the established law of eminent domain
in this state; though rendered in a jet aircraft setting, the force and
tenor of this opinion suggests a great potential impact on the entire
field of public works. While awaiting future pronouncements in this
area by the Washington court, the undertaking of this comment will
be threefold: (1) to explore briefly the law of eminent domain as it
appeared to be in Washington prior to Martin; (2) to ascertain the
meaning of that decision and its impact on prior law; and (3) to
suggest the possible effect on future decisions involving the exercise of
I The title "eminent domain" is credited to the early publicist Grotius who set out
the concept as one of the powers of the State in his 1625 work, De Jure Belli et
Pacis, Lib., 3, C. 20. The Washington court discusses taking in a sovereign capacity
in Kincaid v. Seattle, 74 Wash. 617, 621, 134 Pac. 504, 506 (1913), wherein the court
notes that a sovereign could formerly take freely for himself, the kingdom, or to
give to another, but that when vassalage gave way to citizenship the principle arose
that payment should be made for what is taken. "The constitution does not give the
right to take; that is inherent in the state. Its only office is to define the limitations
to be put upon its exercise; that is, that no property shall ever be taken without
compensation."
2 "Inverse condemnation" should be identified at the outset as an eminent domain
proceeding in which the property owner brings suit to compel condemnation of his
property. In light of the then existing governmental immunity to tort actions, there
was ample justification for treating these damage or taking actions as an extension
of eminent domain rather than under the traditional grounds of nuisance, negligence,
or trespass. Whether this still holds true in Washington following legislative abroga-
tion of the doctrine of sovereign immunity under RCW 4.92.090 and Kelso v. City of
Tacoma, 63 Wn.2d 913, 390 P.2d 2 (1964) (judicial extension to municipalities), is,
of course, open to question.
364 Wn.2d 324, 391 P.2d 540 (1964), 39 WASH. L. REv. 398 (1964).
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governmental functions and activities in the area of public transporta-
tion.
INVERSE CONDEMNATION IN WASHINGTON, PRE-1964
The term "inverse condemnation" characterizes an action by which
the property owner who asserts an injury to his property right takes
the initiative in compelling the offending government body to exercise
its power of condemnation and thus make just compensation to him.
While the label is new to the Washington court, it is unlikely that it
describes an action any different from those which Washington prop-
erty owners have been asserting for many years.
Cause of Action. A common misconception is that the basis of the
power of eminent domain is the state or federal constitution. In fact,
the power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty upon which constitu-
tions place a limitation.5 A consideration of the history and operation
of article I, section 16 (amendment 9) of the Washington Constitution6
and its nearly seventy-five years of judicial interpretation is a neces-
sary preface to the Martin case, though an exhaustive survey of the
area is beyond the scope of this comment.
The fifth amendment to the federal constitution provides that private
property shall not be taken without just compensation, and prior to
1870 nearly every state constitution7 incorporated that provision.
While some early courts recognized that a constitutional "taking"
might exist without a formal divesting of the property owner's title,8
other courts insisted on an actual taking. In an effort to remedy the
resulting inconsistencies and inequities, Illinois, in 1870, amended its
constitution to include the words "or damaged" after the prohibition
against taking; either by amendment or original adoption the Illinois
4 Where courts have felt it necessary to apply a label to these actions there has been
no standardization. See Peckwith v. Lavezzola, 50 Cal.App2d 211, 122 P.2d 678, 682
(1942) ("reverse condemnation"); V.T.C. Lines v. City of Harlan, 313 S.W.2d 573,
579 (Ky. 1958) ("reverse eminent domain").
5 Kincaid v. Seattle, 74 Wash. 617, 134 Pac. 504 (1913).
6 "No private property shall be taken or damaged for public or private use without
just compensation having been first made...." Amendment 9, adopted in 1920, added
a proviso declaring a taking by the state for land reclamation and settlement to be
a public use.
7Only North Carolina and New Hampshire have not, to this date, expressly pro-
vided for compensation in their constitutions.
8 E.g., Hooker v. New Haven & Northhampton Co., 14 Conn. 146 (1846) ; Nevins
v. City of Peoria, 41 Ill. 502 (1866). See also State ex rel. Smith v. Superior Court,
26 Wash. 278, 66 Pac. 385 (1901), which suggests that any substantial interference
with private property that destroys or lessens its value, or which impairs the owner's
right to use or enjoy his property, is a "taking" in the constitutional sense to the
extent of damages suffered, even though title and possession are unimpaired.
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amendment has been incorporated into the constitutions of twenty-four
other states, including Washington. In the 1892 case of Brown v.
Seattle,' the Washington court noted that the addition of "or damaged"
was clearly intended to extend the meaning of "taken." Thereafter the
court began to evolve a "taking-damaging" dichotomy with individual
rules and limitations.
In the years following 1892 the court created numerous distinctions
in an attempt to narrow the broad language of the Brown case, partic-
ularly with regard to the damaging concept." One such effort was to
distinguish the constitutional requirement of taking for "public use"
from the effects of regulation for the "welfare of the public," the latter
being an exercise of police power." Another method was to classify
the governmental activity as tortious and thereby outside the eminent
domain protection;' 2 this normally resulted in no recovery of damages
because of sovereign immunity," or through failure to comply with
municipal charter provisions requiring prompt filing of tort claims. 4 It
should be noted, however, that this particular distinction was often
advantageous to the property owner since the Washington court fre-
quently converted seemingly noncompensable negligence and nuisance
actions into compensable eminent domain or inverse condemnation
actions."
Still another limiting factor was the court's unwillingness to create a
cause of action where none existed under the doctrine of damnum
absque injuria,0 which lead to a usual requirement of some physical
9 5 Wash. 35, 31 Pac. 313 (1892).
10 E.g., Fletcher v. Seattle, 43 Wash. 627, 86 Pac. 1046 (1906).
11 Conger v. Pierce County, 116 Wash. 27, 36, 198 Pac. 377, 380 (1921) (dictum).
See also, e.g., Kahin v. City of Seattle, 64 Wn2d 886, 395 P2d 79 (1964) ; Bowes v.
City of Aberdeen, 58 Wash. 535, 109 Pac. 369 (1910). The Supreme Court has
observed that "there is no set formula to determine where regulation ends and
taking begins." Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962). See
generally, Comment, Distinguishing Eminent Domain from Police Power and Tort,
38 WASH. L. REv. 607 (1963).
12 E.g., Dempsey v. Seattle, 187 Wash. 38, 59 P2d 923 (1936) ; Willit v. Seattle,
96 Wash. 632, 165 Pac. 876 (1917) ; Casassa v. Seattle, 75 Wash. 367, 134 Pac. 1080
(1913).
13 But see Comment, Abolition of Sovereign Immunity in Washington, 36 WASH.
L. REv. 312 (1961) ; Peck, Claims Against the State, 38 WASH. L. REv. 498 (1963)
Note, 39 WASH L. REv. 275 (1964).
14 RCW 35.31.020 (first class cities) ; RCW 35.23.340 (second class cities).
"-5 In Wong Kee Jun v. Seattle, 143 Wash. 479, 255 Pac. 645 (1927), 2 WASH. L.
REv. 247 (1927), the court reviewed a number of its prior decisions and clarified some
existing confusion by holding that where there is an injury to private property which
could have been treated as a condemnation proceeding, the city could not claim that the
damage was done tortiously in order to bar recovery under the charter limitation of
thirty days for filing tort claims. To do this, according to the court, would elevate
the city charter over the state constitution.
16 Loss or damage occasioned without wrong for which there is no legal remedy
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invasion or technical trespass as a condition precedent to recovery.17
Various other specialized limitations on governmental liability were
developed, such as the difference between grading and regrading a
street or alley in an action claiming deprivation of light, air, or access; 18
the holding that a non-abutting property owner could not show any
special or peculiar injury differing from that of the public generally,
and therefore could not recover;"0 and the application of the common
law concept of surface waters as a "common enemy" in actions alleg-
ing inundation or damage to land as a consequence of nearby public
works. 0 In addition, the Washington court imported a "substantial-
or recovery. Washington courts have tended to use this conclusion as if it were a
reason. E.a., Wilkening v. State, 54 Wn.2d 692, 344 P.2d 204 (1959); Taylor v.
Chicago, M., St. P. & P. RIR., 85 Wash. 592, 148 Pac. 887 (1915) ; Hieber v. Spo-
kane, 73 Wash. 122, 131 Pac. 478 (1913); Smith v. St. Paul, M. & Man. Ry., 39
Wash. 355, 81 Pac. 840 (1905).
17 Absent a showing of negligence, it was held in Clark v. Seattle, 156 Wash. 319,
325, 287 Pac. 29, 31 (1930), that recovery must be predicated on (1) a direct invasion
of private property; (2) a deliberate taking; or (3) damage directly and proximately
caused by one or the other. Accord, Farnandis v. Great No. Ry., 41 Wash. 486, 84
Pac. 18 (1906). But see Keesling v. Seattle, 52 Wn2d 247, 324 P.2d 806 (1958).
18 A city may establish the initial grade of a street or alley at any point reasonably
necessary for public travel without liability to abutting property owners. While the
grade may be maintained and improved, a material change of grade constitutes re-
grading and the abutting property owner may invoke his constitutional protection.
This distinction was first made in Fletcher v. Seattle, 43 Wash. 627, 86 Pac. 1046
(1906); it was most recently applied in Hagen v. City of Seattle, 54 Wn2d 218, 339
P2d 79 (1959). It is clear that an abutting property owner has a right of access to
an established street that is protected against interference without just compensation;
see McMoran v. State, 55 Wn2d 37, 345 P2d 598 (1959) (installing a divider curb
between the property and highway) ; Docksteader v. Centralia, 3 Wn2d 325, 100 P.2d
377 (1940) (building a viaduct in the street); Keil v. Grays Harbor & P. S. Ry., 71
Wash. 163, 127 Pac. 1113 (1912) (running a train down the street) ; Hatch v. Tacoma,
0. & G. H. R.m, 6 Wash. 1, 32 Pac. 1063 (1893) (elevating the street level to
accommodate train).
10 Clute v. North Yakima & V. Ry., 62 Wash. 531, 114 Pac. 513 (1911) ; Ponischil
v. Hoquiam Sash & Door Co., 41 Wash. 303, 83 Pac. 316 (1906). Furthermore, in
O'Connel v. Seattle, 62 Wash. 218, 113 Pac. 762 (1911), it was made clear that the
terms "abutting," "adjacent" and "bordering" are all synonymous in this respect.
Recent aircraft taking and damaging cases have retained this general requirement
through use of the term "superadjacent."
20 As already noted, governmental units are not liable for consequential damages
to private property occasioned by the original grading of streets or alleys, though
drainage problems frequently result. This governmental protection is further broad-
ened by the common law doctrine that surface water is a common enemy against which
any landowner may take steps for the protection and continued use of his land.
Wilkening v. State, 54 Wn2d 692, 344 P2d 204 (1959) ; Thorpe v. Spokane, 78 Wash.
488, 139 Pac. 221 (1914); Wood v. Tacoma, 66 Wash. 266, 119 Pac. 859 (1911).
Certain limits have been placed on this doctrine for the property owner's protection.
For example, where street or highway construction involves collecting water by
artificial means and depositing it on private property, there is a constitutional dam-
aging. Ulery v. Kitsap County, 188 Wash. 519, 63 P2d 352 (1936); cf. Sigurdson
v. Seattle, 48 Wn.2d 155, 292 P2d 214 (1956) (tort recovery). A public use which
inundates adjoining property with water, sewage, or dirt, thereby destroying its use-
fulness, is a constitutional taking. Conger v. Pierce County, 116 Wash. 27, 198 Pac.
377 (1921) ; Wendel v. Spokane County, 27 Wash. 121, 67 Pac. 576 (1902). But if
injury could be averted by drains or dikes, it is merely a damaging. Buxel v. King
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incidental" distinction from tort law which required a plaintiff to show
substantial damage resulting from the governmental activity.2t
The property owner who was able to avoid these judicial limitations
and conditions might still encounter difficulties due to the statute of
limitations.
Statute of Limitations. While Washington has a number of dif-
ferent statutes of limitations for a wide variety of actions, none ex-
pressly places a limitation on the time for bringing a constitutional
taking or damaging action under article I, section 16. Property owners
in the early "damaging" actions advanced a number of arguments in
an attempt to invoke a more favorable statutory period, but the court
applied the short two-year statute governing actions not otherwise
provided for in the code." This was altered in 1918 when the court
handed down companion decisions which changed the statute ap-
plicable to actions for a damaging and established a separate limitation
on actions for a taking.
In Jacobs v. Seattle,"2 the plaintiff sought compensation for loss of
value to his property occasioned by construction and operation of a
city garbage incinerator on abutting property. The city asserted that
the action was barred by the two-year statute while the plaintiff
claimed the city's power of eminent domain raised an implied promise
that just compensation would be made. The court adopted the latter
view and applied the three-year statute which governs implied con-
tracts not in writing.24
At the same time, in Aylmore v. Seattle,25 the question was first
presented as to which statute governs recovery for an actual taking.
The city pleaded both the two and three-year statutes since either
would have barred recovery. The court, however, reasoned: (1) that
holding and using property is an incident of ownership or title; (2)
that title cannot be vested where none has been divested; and (3)
that no title could be divested from the plaintiff short of the statutory
ten year period for adverse possession.26 Although the plaintiff could
County, 60 Wn.2d 404, 374 P.2d 250 (1962) ; Wiley v. Aberdeen, 123 Wash. 539, 212
Pac. 1049 (1923).21 Buxel v. King County, 60 Wn2d 404, 374 P2d 250 (1962) ; Cheskov v. Port of
Seattle, 55 Wn.2d 416, 348 P.2d 673 (1960) ; Jacobs v. Seattle, 93 Wash. 171, 160 Pac.
299 (1916).
22 RCW 4.16.130. Denney v. Everett, 46 Wash. 342, 89 Pac. 934 (1907).
23 100 Wash. 524, 171 Pac. 662 (1918).
24 RCW 4.16.080(3).




not require removal of the city street from his property, he neverthe-
less had ten years under the constitution for bringing his action to force
condemnation.1
7
Frequently litigated along with the statute of limitations question
was the issue of when the statute began to run. Here the substantiality
of the claimed injury was critical; so long as the property owner had
suffered only inconsequential damage he had no cause of action and
the period did not commence. Any subsequent change or increase of
use which rendered the previously inconsequential damage substantial,
however, immediately started the three-year statute running.
8
Measure of Damages. Under both the constitution and the earliest
eminent domain decisions in Washington, it was clear that the proper
compensation for "taking" was the jury-determined value of the prop-
erty taken.2" Closely related and equally clear was the rule that a
property owner might recover for the taking before work proceeded
on his property. 0 The courts were unable to extract this same clarity
from the constitution, with regard to the measure of compensation or
the time of payment for a consequential damaging.3
As to time, it was resolved quite early that the constitution did not
require the property owner to submit his damage claim in advance.32
27 Recent expressions of the period of limitation are that the three-year statute
[RCW 4.16.080(3)] is applicable to constitutional damaging of private real property.
Cheskov v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wn.2d 416, 348 P2d 673 (1960) ; Ackerman v. Port
of Seattle, 55 Wn.2d 400, 348 P.2d 664 (1960); Papac v. Montesano, 49 Wn.2d 484,
303 P2d 654 (1956). But an action for a constitutional taking is not barred by any
statute of limitations and may be brought any time before title to the property taken
is acquired by prescription which in Washington is ten years. Ackerman v. Port of
Seattle, mtpra.
28Buxel v. King County, 60 Wn2d 404, 374 P.2d 250 (1960); Papac v. Monte-
sano, 49 Wn2d 484, 303 P.2d 654 (1956).
29 "[W]hich compensation shall be ascertained by a jury, unless a jury be
waived... ." WAsH. CoNsT. art. I, § 16. Seattle Transfer Co. v. Seattle, 27 Wash.
520, 68 Pac. 90 (1902) ; Brown v. Seattle, 5 Wash. 35, 31 Pac. 313 (1892).
. 0 "[W]ithout just compensation having been first made, or paid into court....
WASH. CoNsr. art. I, § 16 (emphasis added). Where there was a taking without
condemnation, the fair market value at the time of the trial was allowed rather than
the value when the property was taken, or at some intervening time, on the reasoning
that the land would not be considered taken until the value had been paid. Distler v.
Grays Harbor & P. S. Ry., 76 Wash. 391, 136 Pac. 364 (1913).
In Brown v. Seattle, 5 Wash. 35, 31 Pac. 313 (1892), the court noted the
wording of the constitution and recognized the mechanical difficulties involved in
requiring prior payment for damaging, but suggested that these difficulties would
have to be met when they arose. They arose the following year in Lewis v. Seattle,
5 Wash. 741, 32 Pac. 794 (1893), where the court said it was up to the legislature
to decide when payment for damages must be made in advance. The legislature im-
mediately enacted a comprehensive statute that resulted in at least fifteen years of
confused litigation before its repeal. See particularly, Ettor v. Tacoma, 57 Wash. 50,
106 Pac. 478 (1910), afrlrinaiwe upheld o. rehearing, 57 Wash. 56, 107 Pac. 1061
(1910), revd, 228 U.S. 148 (1912).
32 Peterson v. Smith, 6 Wash. 163, 32 Pac. 1050 (1893).
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The claim could be withheld until actual condemnation was begun, or
until the owner himself compelled condemnation."3 These decisions
enabled the property owner to postpone the determination of his claim
until the full extent of the damage became certain.
The court had little difficulty in extending the measure of damages
for a "taking" to those claims involving a partial taking and a resulting
injury to the untaken remainder. It was established that the measure
should be the market value of the land taken, together with any reduc-
tion in value to the remaining contiguous property,"4 and that this
reduction or depreciation was the difference between the fair market
value before and after the taking."5
Recovery was far more difficult for the property owner who sought
only damages for a reduction in value of his physically untouched land.
Here the court was able to limit recovery on the basis of the injury.
Damage was required to be material, 6 and of such a permanent char-
acter as to impair the value of the fee;3" further, the decrease in prop-
erty value had to be directly attributable to the adjoining public use."
Recovery was denied for claims based on mere depreciation of prop-
erty value from noise, smoke, fumes, and odors coming from, and
necessarily incident to, some lawful activity being carried out on the
adjacent property. 9 Mere inconvenience, whether permanent 0 or
temporary,4' or fear of anticipated results of the governmental activity
were insufficient even though sale of the property was made difficult or
38 Failure of the property owner to take prior steps to compel condemnation was
also considered in Thorberg v. Hoquiam, 77 Wash. 679, 138 Pac. 304 (1914), where
it was held that if the owner stood by and watched the taking in the form of some
public improvement, he waived his right to enjoin the work pending compensation
but retained an action at law for damages.
34 Seattle & Mont. Ry. v. Roeder, 30 Wash. 244, 70 Pac. 498 (1902).
35 Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. P.U.D. No. 1, 123 F.2d 286 (9th Cir. 1941),
cert. denied, 315 U.S. 814 (1942).
3 6 Lund v. Idaho & Wash. No. R.R., 50 Wash. 574, 97 Pac. 665 (1908).
3T Great No. Ry. v. Quigg, 213 Fed. 873 (W.D. Wash. 1914).
38 Kincaid v. Seattle, 74 Wash. 617, 134 Pac. 504 (1913).
39 Taylor v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R.R., 85 Wash. 592, 148 Pac. 887 (1915) ; DeKay
v. North Yakima & V. R.R., 71 Wash. 648, 129 Pac. 574 (1913); Smith v. St. Paul,
M. & Man. Ry., 39 Wash. 355, 81 Pac. 840 (1905). In Brady v. Tacoma, 145 Wash.
351, 259 Pac. 1089 (1927), the court attempted to update these "railroad" cases but
reached the same conclusion and reversed a lower court finding of damage from a
"loud" nearby city power station. The court reasoned that the station was not im-
properly or unreasonably located and that the city had acquired as much land for
the plant as was reasonable. The court then prophesied: "To hold otherwise would
be to stop all progress and invite a flood of litigation which would, we fear, destroy
commerce and industry." Id. at 362, 259 Pac. at 1093.
40 Ponischil v. Hoquiam Sash & Door Co., 41 Wash. 303, 83 Pac. 316 (1906).
41 In re West Marginal Way, 109 Wash. 116, 186 Pac. 644 (1919); Hieber v.
Spokane, 73 Wash. 122, 131 Pac. 478 (1913).
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impossible.42  Though these complainants might show an actual re-
sulting damage, it was considered incidental and non-compensable in
the absence of some physical invasion or taking. The court's position
persisted despite the constitutional prohibition that property not be
taken "or damaged."
The effect of these limiting decisions and rules was to align Washing-
ton with the majority of states in rejecting an interpretation of "dam-
aged" which would include every ascertainable depreciation in the
market value of property adjacent to a public use. 8 The role of the
supreme court has been largely to determine whether a stated claim is
compensable; the trial court has been left to struggle with the practical
application of the broad "before and after" formula. The appellate
record is therefore of little aid in resolving, or even understanding, the
various mechanical difficulties that might be encountered."
This was the rather restrictive situation that faced a complaining
property owner in his suit against a governmental unit for a taking or
damaging prior to the decision in Martin v. Port of Seattle. The ques-
tion now is how Martin may have changed this, and what might rea-
sonably be expected for the future?
THE PRESBNT AND FUT.URE: ARCRAFT AND APORTS
The advent of widespread commercial air travel following World
War II has produced a wealth of litigation by property owners in the
vicinity of airports. On several previous occasions the Washington
court had considered inverse condemnation actions involving the
Seattle-Tacoma Airport, 5 but only as to alleged taking or damaging
by flights directly over private property. The most significant aspect
of the Martin decision, and one that should come in for vigorous dis-
cussion and consideration, is the recovery allowed nearby property
owners who were not subjected to direct overflights.
Martin v. Port of Seattle was originally instituted as two separate
suits by 196 individual owners of property located south of the main
runway at the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport. The two actions,
subsequently joined for convenience before trial, were distinguishable
42 Aubol v. Tacoma, 167 Wash. 442, 9 P.2d 780 (1932).
43 See 2 NicHoLs, EMINENT DomAIN § 6.441(1) (3d ed. rev. 1963).
44 See generally Comment, Measure of Damages in Eminent Domain Proceedings
in Washington, 2 WASH. L. REv. 192 (1927).
45 See Cheskov v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wn2d 416, 348 P.2d 673 (1960) ; Ackerman
v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wn2d 400, 348 P.2d 664 (1960) ; Anderson v. Port of Seattle,
49 Wn.2d 528, 304 P.2d 705 (1956).
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largely by the location of the properties involved and the correspond-
ing existence or absence of actual jet overflights. Plaintiffs generally
alleged that use of the airport by jets had unreasonably interfered with
the use and enjoyment of their properties, causing a substantial depre-
ciation in values for which the defendant municipal corporation, as
owner-operator of the airport, was liable. The trial court agreed, and
a unanimous Washington Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that
"when the land of an individual is diminished in value for the public
benefit, then justice, and the constitution, require that the public
pay."46 This broad statement, in light of prior litigation in the area,
may seem somewhat startling. It is, however, nothing more than a
return to the philosophy of Brown v. Seattle, where, in 1892, the court
declared that "if private property is damaged for the public benefit,
the public should make good the loss to the individual. Such always
was the equity of the case, and the constitution makes the hitherto
disregarded equity now the law of it." 7
It has already been noted that the Brown case fell rapidly from
favor and was, for all practical purposes, distinguished to death." In
reaching the same conclusion as Brown, the court in Martin apparently
chose to disregard or reject some seventy years of judicially evolved
distinctions and limitations on eminent domain actions in Washington
although no prior decision is expressly overruled or distinguished and,
for that matter, only a single Washington case is cited. It may be
argued that the decision is strictly limited to actions involving jet
aircraft; but the reasoning of the opinion and the very breadth of its
pronouncements suggest a more sweeping edict-one that may effect a
variety of property owners.
Cause of Action. One class of complainants represented in Martin
claimed that direct flights over their property constituted the "taking"
of an air easement of the type first recognized in United States v.
Causby 9 The other group, while not claiming overflights, alleged that
their property had been "damaged" by the jet noise for which they
too, within the meaning of the Washington Constitution, were entitled
to just compensation. The trial court found a "taking" as to the first
46 64 Wn.2d at 333, 391 P2d at 547.
47 5 Wash. 35, 41, 31 Pac. 313, 315 (1892).
48 See text accompanying note 10 supra.
49 328 U.S. 256 (1946). Causby recovered for the taking of an air easement over
his chicken farm by flights of military aircraft from a nearby field. Planes coming
in as low as eighty-three feet so alarmed his chickens that they would kill them-
selves, rendering the farm valueless for raising chickens.
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group, and a "damaging" as to the second. The supreme court, noting
that in essence the complaint was one of excessive noise and vibration
rather than of physical invasion, chose not to stress the taking-
damaging distinction. In the words of the court, the distinction was
apt to be "more difficult and treacherous than convincing or utilitar-
ian.""5O When coupled with a later statement that this distinction
belongs to a "bygone era,"'" the implication is clearly a permanent
departure. Most troublesome is an attempt to determine why the
supreme court felt it necessary to take this approach in affirming a
trial court decision based on two distinct classes of complainants.
It has already been indicated that the Washington Constitution
affords a broader base for protecting property rights than does the
federal constitution or the constitutions of twenty-five states with the
"taking" prohibition only.52 One would expect little aid from decisions
in these jurisdictions, particularly in light of the conceptual difficulties
encountered by the federal courts. A number of recent cases dem-
onstrate that there are but two circumstances under which a property
owner in the vicinity of an airport may expect to recover from the
United States for a "taking," regardless of the diminution of property
value: (1) when his property is subject to actual overflights and (2)
absent such overflights, when resulting interference is such that the
owner is forced to abandon his property." The federal position, clearly
stated in United States v. Willow River Power Co.,5" is that "damage
alone gives courts no power to require compensation." With the addi-
tional remedial category of "or damaged," the Washington courts have
been able to view "property" in its broadest sense,5" and damage alone
could logically justify compensation; but federal decisions with their
technical trespass requirement would not support recovery for those
50 64 Wn.2d at 327, 391 P.2d at 543 (1964).
51 "The specific purpose of the addition of language beyond that of the United
States Constitution is to avoid the distinctions attached to the word 'taking' appropriate
to a bygone era. It is unnecessary to become embroiled in the technical difference
between a taking and a damaging in order to accord the broader conceptual scope
intended by the additional language .... We hold that no overflight or direct physical
invasion of the airspace over the land is necessary in order to maintain an action under
the 'taking or damaging' provisions of the state constitution." Id. at 332, 391 P2d
at 546.
52 See text accompanying note 9 supra.
53 Batten v. United States, 306 F2d 580, 585 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 955 (1963).
" 324 U.S. 499, 510 (1945).
55 Under the Washington Constitution "property" includes the unrestricted right to




parties in the Martin case who were not subject to trespassory over-
flights.
Some analytical difficulty is prompted by the use of federal authority
in Martin and the statement that "it also appears that the right of a
property owner to proceed against the federal government on a theory
that the noise of jet aircraft have 'taken' his right to use and enjoyment
of land is well established, recognized and accepted."5 The implica-
tion is that not only may the property owner bring an action but that
he has some likelihood of recovering against the government for a
"taking" based on jet noise without a physical invasion of the super-
adjacent airspace." None of the five federal decisions cited support
this proposition. Four of the cases involved direct overhead flights,5"
and the fifth, Batten v. United States,5" denied any recovery in the
absence of overflights, despite a showing that jet noise from nearby
flights had reduced the value of the several complainants' properties
by up to fifty-five percent.6" Chief Judge Murrah, dissenting in Batten,
urged that a constitutional taking need not necessarily depend on a
physical invasion of the damaged property; rather, governmental inter-
ference, which adversely affects private economic interests, could
amount to a taking.6' The fact remains, however, that no federal case
has allowed a property owner to recover for property damage absent
some trespassory overflight, and this makes it extremely difficult to
agree with the Washington court's statement in the Martin opinion
that the view of Judge Murrah "more likely... represents the position
of the United States Supreme Court."
6 2
56 64 Wn.2d at 328, 391 P.2d at 544.
57 The Washington court was aware of the overflight requirement in the federal
decisions, though apparently not in agreement. This is evidenced by a reference to
"the perhaps unwarranted assumption commonly found in the federal cases that
sound and vibration waves cannot be considered a 'physical invasion'...." 64 Wn2d
at 326, n. 4, 391 P.2d at 543, n. 4.
58 Aaron v. United States, 311 F.2d 798 (Ct. Cl. 1963) ; Jensen v. United States,
305 F.2d 444 (Ct. C1. 1962) ; Davis v. United States, 295 F.2d 931 (Ct. Cl. 1961);
Bacon v. United States, 295 F.2d 936 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
59 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963).6 0 Ibid. Findings of the district court were that jet noise and vibration had reduced
the land value of the complaining parties by 40.8% to 55.3%. 306 F.2d at 583, n. 3.
61 Judge Murrah asked "at what point the interference rises to the dignity of a
'taking'? Is it when the window glass rattles, or when it falls out; when the smoke
suffocates the inhabitants, or merely makes them cough; when the noise makes
family conversation difficult, or when it stifles it entirely? In other words, does the
'taking' occur when the property interest is totally destroyed, or when it is substan-
tially diminished?" 306 F.2d at 587.
62 64 Wn2d at 331, 391 P2d at 546. If the Supreme Court had abandoned the
physical invasion requirement in favor of Judge Murrah's position, the Batten case
would have been an appropriate place to so hold. The Court's denial of certiorari (371
U.S. 955 (1963)), while not conclusive, suggests that the requirement persists.
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Although the Washington court elected not to stress the "difficult
and treacherous" distinction between property that is taken and that
merely damaged, a more clearly reasoned result could have been
reached by leaving the parties in the categories found by the trial
court. No difficulty is then encountered in justifying recovery by the
property owners subjected to direct overflights and resulting loss of
property value. Nor did the other group pose any issue that could not
have been resolved under the Washington Constitution and prior law;
the court need only have held that recovery is not limited to the effect
of unreasonable noise coming from overflights--that such interference
can be equally "damaging" when it travels horizontally to reach non-
superadjacent property owners. In this manner the Martin decision,
while reaching an identical result, could be more easily placed in per-
spective with the established Washington law.
While the reasoning behind this departure from the taking-damaging
distinction in Martin is vague, such is not the case with the court's
clear and forthright rejection of the necessity of distinguishing between
"substantial" interference with the use and enjoyment of property and
mere "incidental" damaging in an inverse condemnation action." The
court reasoned that it should be even easier for the public to pay small
claims than large ones for benefits taken from property owners. From
a monetary standpoint this may be true, but the idea is not likely to be
met with any enthusiasm by various governmental agencies, partic-
ularly the State Highway Department. There was a certain utility in
the limited construction placed on the constitutional concept of "dam-
aged" that allowed the courts to balance a community or public interest
in the activity against the asserted injury to the individual. The
Martin decision rejects this balancing process as being of "dubious
relevance or utility."64 The court's new approach clearly offers an
element of predictability to such actionable injuries; this could be
more than offset, however, by a burgeoning of claims each time there
is public construction. Even though the damage alleged might be
inconsequential, or perhaps purely imaginary, these claims would have
to be met, with the likely result of increasing the cost of construction
of public works and perhaps even materially retarding development in
a number of areas.
This approach has the further result of placing public activities at a




disadvantage when compared to similar private endeavors-in effect, a
discrimination against governmental works. The balancing process is
an integral part of a private remedial action sounding in tort, and
traditionally a private owner has been allowed to use his land in many
way which adversely affect the value of neighboring land without re-
sulting liability. 5 The Martin opinion indicates that by showing an
offending use to have been made for the public benefit, and proving a
correlative diminution in property value, the public will be made to
pay. This is consistent with the constitution, but it is contrary to prior
holdings of the court that an action which could not be maintained
against a private party could not be maintained against the state or its
agent.66 With substantial injury no longer a requisite of recovery, it is
clear that the court has adopted a view even more liberal than the long
rejected philosophy of Brown v. Seattle.6"
The requirements of an actionable claim for inverse condemnation
in Washington would now appear to be (1) a claim of personal dis-
comfort from a nearby (though no longer necessarily adjacent or
abutting) public activity, (2) grounded in the constitutional require-
ment of compensation for private property "taken or damaged" (with-
out necessarily distinguishing which), (3) for which some resulting
reduction (though not necessarily "substantial") in property value
can be proved.
Statute of Limitations. Abrogation of the necessity of establishing
either a "taking" or a "damaging" is likely to introduce difficulty into
the area of selecting an appropriate statute of limitations. 8 As already
noted, the rule in Washington had developed that the three-year stat-
65 Erection of a garage, a factory, an apartment or even a dwelling of inferior
quality in a desirable residential section may distinctly depreciate the values in the
area; yet, if properly zoned, the affected property owners would have no remedy.
It would seem a strange perversion of legal principles if the right of an owner to
recover damages depended on his ability to show that the offending structure was
erected for public good rather than private profit, or if one man could claim compen-
sation for a public hospital next to his house while another would be denied recovery
for his identical damage from a private hospital. See generally PROSSER, TORTS § 99,
at 620-23 (3d ed. 1964).
66 See text accompanying notes 16, 17 supra.
67 See text accompanying notes 9, 10, 47 supra.
68 Such difficulty will not be a new experience for the court. In Ackerman v. Port
of Seattle, in an opinion withdrawn by the court and now appearing only in 329 P.2d
210 (1958), the court overruled all prior decisions applying the three-year statute of
limitations to constitutional damagings. Sixteen months later when the opinion re-
appeared in 55 Wn.2d 400, 348 P.2d 664 (1960), that part had been replaced with a
reaffirmance of those cases applying the three-year statute.
69 See text accompanying notes 23-27 mspra.
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ute was applicable to a "damaging" but for a "taking" the ten-year
statute applied.69
The court has several alternatives at this juncture. Most obvious
would be continued adherence to the established rule, necessarily reviv-
ing the departed distinction. Another possibility would be elimination
of any limitation as to inverse condemnation actions. 0 Somewhere
between these two extremes lies the alternative of applying a single
statute to all claims, regardless of whether a distinction might be
made on the basis of taking or damaging; but here the court could find
itself bound to a limitation that would not be equitable under all cir-
cumstances. Although a longer period for all actions would be fair to
genuinely injured property owners, there remains a serious question of
fairness to the public in imposing additional years of potential liability
on the governmental entity engaged in the offending activities, partic-
ularly since the most insubstantial injury may now be actionable.7' On
the other hand, a short uniform period would be adverse to property
owners and would necessitate a change in the requirements for acquisi-
tion of prescriptive rights. 2 It is suggested that when this issue is
raised, the Washington court will find it advantageous to return to the
taking-damaging distinction.
Measure of Damages. By rejecting the necessity of a property
owner showing "substantial" damages, the court in Martin caught
everyone, including both parties to the action, by surprise. Plaintiffs
had set out to prove that jet traffic had substantially reduced their
70 It was suggested in Note, 34 WASH. L. REv. 239, 245 (1959), that no statute of
limitations should apply in eminent domain actions inasmuch as the state constitution
makes no such provision, and the legislature has not provided for the action under
any of the existing statutes. However, a complete removal of any time limitation
would likewise remove the incentive for injured parties to promptly bring their
actions.
71 Departure from "substantial" injury as a condition of recovery will have the
further side-effect of confusing when the statute of limitations starts running. In the
past no cause of action for a constitutional damaging accrued until such time as the
offending acts substantially interfered with the use and enjoyment of property. E.g.,
Buxel v. King County, 60 Wn.2d 404, 374 P2d 250 (1962) ; Jacobs v. Seattle, 100
Wash. 524, 171 Pac. 662 (1918). If, as the Martin decision suggests, a cause of
action accrues immediately upon the ability to show some measurable damage from
a nearby public use, then some interesting questions could arise as to whether the
statute might start running from the announcement of a proposed project, or a
number of other prior times when any injury might be reflected solely in the market
value of the property.
72No Washington statute expressly governs the acquisition of prescriptive rights.
Wasmund v. Harm, 36 Wash. 170, 78 Pac. 777 (1904), held that in the absence of a
statute of limitations applicable to incorporeal heriditaments the court would apply,
by analogy, the local limitations for quieting title to lands. The judiciary could
change the prescriptive period, but in view of the precedent grown up around this
application this does not seem likely.
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property values, 3 defendants attempted to show that they had suffered
noncompensable annoyance and discomfort. 4 The court, however,
ruled that "substantial interference" and "substantial injury" are not
a requisite of recovery in inverse condemnation; rather the sole meas-
ure of recovery is the proveable injury to the market value of the
property.75
The court further rejected the idea that a balancing of public and
private interests is necessary under this type of action. The court, in
the past, has tended to import certain traditional tort factors into its
eminent domain considerations. When one considers the underlying
basis for nuisance as opposed to inverse condemnation it can readily be
seen that there is a valid issue as to whether such a balancing process
is appropriate to the latter action.76 Balancing is a product of the
common law tort of nuisance" while inverse condemnation rests on a
constitutional requirement of just compensation for private property
taken or damaged pursuant to some public use. There is no express
leeway in the constitution for a balancing of interests; it seems rather
to have become an element of the judicial process gradually through a
combination of common law and common sense. But with the constitu-
tion making unqualified provision for paying for whatever is taken or
damaged, a strong argument can be made that it is not equitable to
shift to the private property owner the burden of damage to his prop-
erty as a contribution to the public interest." The court in Martin v.
Port of Seattle was so persuaded, ruling that the full extent of appro-
priate balancing is attained, independent of a separate and distinct
process, when the property owner shows injury to the market value
of his property. Rejection of the idea that the individual must bear
some inconvenience and loss of peace and quiet as the cost of living in
a modern, progressing society" marks a departure from a considerable
segment of prior Washington law.8
73 Brief of Respondents, p. 4.
74 Brief of Appellant, p. 177.
75 64 Wn.2d at 333, 391 P.2d at 546, citing Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wn2d
400, 348 P.2d 664 (1960).
76 Some earlier Washington opinions have also attempted to depart from the tort
balancing concept in these constitutional actions. E.g., Jacobs v. Seattle, 100 Wash.
524, 527, 171 Pac. 662, 663 (1918); Kincaid v. Seattle, 74 Wash. 617, 134 Pac. 504
(1913) (dissent).
77 See PROSSER, TORTS § 90, pp. 619-23 (3d ed. 1964).
78 See Comment, 47 MINN. L. REV. 889, 896-97 (1963).
79 64 Wn.2d at 333, 391 P.2d at 546.
80 Ibid. Perhaps indicative of a certain lack of clarity in Martin is the fact that an
opposite interpretation has been made, i.e., that the individual nurt bear a certain
amount of inconvenience, and that each case will involve a balancing of private versus
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The formula for determining the amount of damage suffered is fre-
quently, and broadly, stated to be the fair market value 2 of what was
taken; or the difference between the fair market value of the property
before and after the damaging. Problems inherent in this seemingly
simple rule are well illustrated by the Martin case.
Clear enough is the finding that jet flights resulted in compensable
damage to the plaintiffs' property. Arriving at the amount of com-
pensation is possible under the before and after rule by working with
two figures: (1) the fair market value of each parcel at a point in time
immediately preceding the first injury caused by jet flights ("before");
and (2) the corresponding value of each parcel at the time when dam-
ages are being determined ("after"). A reduction of the latter below
the former would result in compensable damage. The apparent simplic-
ity of the process in this case, however, is obfuscated by two lower
court findings which were necessarily affirmed through a process of
being neither discussed nor modified by the supreme court. First, that
prior to the advent of jet traffic, "flights of piston driven aircraft over
or in the close proximity to plaintiffs' properties from and after Septem-
ber, 1947, substantially diminished the fair market value of said prop-
erties.""s Second, that monetary damages to the properties should be
the "fair cash market value after allowing for diminution in value
occasioned by operation of piston driven aircraft only.... "" On
remand it would not appear that the jury will be working with only the
before and after valuations suggested above. Because the defendant
acquired a prescriptive avigation easement over some of these prop-
erties for piston driven aircraft-a right no doubt being exercised
today to some extent-a value must also be established for this ease-
public interests. Note, 39 WAsH. L. REv. 398, 402 (1964). It is submitted that this
is not correct. The Washington court suggests, rather, that the ability of the individual
to prove some loss takes in the full extent of balancing allowed under the constitution.
Clearly such items as noise and inconvenience of jet flights are a major factor in
reducing the market value of nearby properties, and there would be no way to com-
pute and subtract a corresponding amount for the reasonable and expectable incon-
venience even should the individual be required to bear it. Such was the pre-Martin
result obtained under the "substantial damage" requirement. An interesting compari-
son is found in Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100, 103 (1962),
where it was said: "It is equally clear that a reasonable volume of noise... must be
endured as the price of living in a modern industrial society." The Oregon Consti-
tution, however, is one of those without the "or damaged" protection.
81 See cases cited in notes 40-43 supra.
8 2 "Fair market value is the amount of money which a purchaser willing but not
obliged to buy the property would pay to an owner willing but not obliged to sell it,
taking into consideration all uses to which the land was adapted and might in reason
be applied." 4 Niciols, EMINENT Domxx § 122(1) (3d ed. rev. 1963). See also
Symposium, Damage to Property Not Taken, 1957 U. ItL. L.F. 296.83 Transcript, p. 37.
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ment in order that the loss of property value may be proportionately
reduced.8" The actual mechanics of this process should tax the facilities
of even a very superior jury; and since compensation must be deter-
mined on a plot by plot basis, the difficulties will be multiplied by the
number of recovering property owners.
Another problem, apparently overlooked, is our generally spiralling
economy which has resulted in a gradual but continuous appreciation
in real estate values. Neither the trial court nor the supreme court
provided for this inflationary factor. The trial court no doubt reasoned
that since the complaint was of a continuing damage, the plaintiffs
should be allowed to show their loss at the latest possible point in time
-upon remand for establishing the amount of recovery. However, the
greater the period of time between the "before" and "after" valuations,
the more inflation will reduce the ultimate recovery; sufficient delay
could cause the latter value to exceed the former with the result that
despite a finding of damage there would be no proveable loss and hence
no recovery. To avoid such a hollow victory for the injured property
owner in inverse condemnations, the courts should provide for remov-
ing normal property appreciation from the "after" valuation.
Mention should also be made of the apparent demise of another long
standing rule in this area. The supreme court departed, sub silentio,
from the concept that one who purchases his property after the dam-
age, has no cause of action since the reduced value is presumed to be
taken into consideration in the purchase price.86 The trial court refused
to dismiss this action as to twenty property owners who purchased after
the commencement of jet traffic." The supreme court did not mention
84 Id., p. 41.
85 This raises an interesting question as to whether property owners nearby, but
not directly beneath, flights should have any reduction made in their damages. Acker-
man v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wn.2d 400, 348 P.2d 664 (1960), found that there could
be no prescriptive acquisition of a right to damage, as distinguished from a taking.
Further, the rule for acquiring a prescriptive easement, as set out in Schulenbarger
v. Johnstone, 64 Wash. 202, 204, 116 Pac. 843, 844 (1911), is that "one asserting a right
of way must show continuous, uninterrupted and adverse use over a uniform route,
with knowledge of the owner, and during a time when he was able in law to assert
and enforce his rights." (Emphasis added.) Since Martin v. Port of Seattle is the
first decision to depart from the requirement of a physical invasion into the com-
plainant's airspace, the parties not subject to overflights were not previously able to
assert and enforce any right that might ripen into a prescriptive easement or a pre-
scriptive right to damage. This suggests a necessary return to the distinction between
taking and damaging for purposes of determining compensation; and it presents the
rather anomalous possibility that property owner A would have his damages reduced
by the value of a prescriptive avigation easement through his air, while property
owner B, only fifty feet away but not subject to overflights, could show the same
resulting loss of market value which would not be subject to any reduction.
8 Kakeldy v. Columbia & P. S. Ry., 37 Wash. 675, 80 Pac. 205 (1905).
87 Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, p. 5.
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the issue on appeal, and it can only be assumed that both courts felt
that the continuing nature of the damage and the increasing frequency
of flights warranted some recovery. Neveretheless, a genuine question
of bona fides and equity remains as to recovery by these recent pur-
chasers. It has been suggested that if a real estate purchaser has notice
of an impending expansion of a nearby governmental use at the time of
purchase he should be presumed to have assumed that risk rather than
being given a "windfall" upon subsequent materialization of the expan-
sion." It might also be said that a person who buys property at the end
of an established airport runway, in fact, assumes the necessary in-
conveniences, including noise, of its normal operation.89 There seems
to be little justification for this result in the Martin case which permits
property owners a double recovery, contrary to the recent decision in
Anderson v. Port of Seattle.9"
When the various damage issues are finally resolved, there may
remain the question of what the condemnor has acquired. The trial
court found that between 1947 and 1959 the Port of Seattle acquired a
prescriptive air easement over one group of property owners, but that
in retrospect the easement was limited to use by piston-type aircraft
only; flights by jets were found to be a change of use so substantially
different in character and degree as to give rise to a new cause of action.
Although a private servitude is limited to a use of the nature prescrip-
tively acquired,9 it does not necessarily follow that the same rule
should govern a public servitude. In this respect the case of In re West
Marginal Way92 would appear analogous. The effect of that decision was
to permit King County to acquire a full sixty-foot roadway by prescrip-
tion through use of only the middle ten to fifteen feet. The court rea-
soned that this should follow from a law requiring roads to have a
sixty-foot right of way. In the Martin case the glide path acquired by
88 Comment, 47 MINN. L. REv. 889, 898 (1963).
89 Only ten of the 196 complainants acquired their property before the area was
zoned for an airport in 1943. Brief of Appellant, p. 19. Consider PRossER, TORTS § 92,
p. 632 (3d ed. 1964), with regard to the plaintiff who has "come to the nuisance."
9049 Wn2d 528, 304 P.2d 705 (1956). A property owner brought suit for damages
from low overflights; during pendency of the suit the defendant purchased plaintiff's
property at its fair market value with no reduction for the alleged damages. Plain-
tiff still sought recovery for temporary damages during his ownership. This was
denied on the grounds that any recovery would constitute a double recovery.
91 The Restatement rule is that the extent of a prescriptive easement is fixed by
the use through which it was acquired. 5 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 477 (1944).
But in § 479 is the suggestion that an increased use resulting from a normal and fore-
seeable evolution of the use of a dominant tenement, balanced against the increased
burden in the servient tenement, could be upheld.
92 109 Wash. 116, 186 Pac. 644 (1919).
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prescription for conventional aircraft was in fact no more than a high-
way in the air,9" and it is clear, even without the Municipal Airports Act
of 1945,"' or the Federal Aviation Act of 1958," 5 that airplanes require
sufficient air space to make a safe descent and landing. It does not
seem logical, or consistent with the rest of the country,"8 that because
the Port of Seattle was not fully utilizing its prescriptive avigation
right it should be limited to something less than the full necessary use
including use by jets.
The Port of Seattle may receive a rather limited right indeed. If the
prescriptive easement already acquired was limited to use by piston-
driven aircraft, it follows that this purchased easement will be limited
to use by jets, perhaps even to jets with a maximum of four engines.
This, together with the implication that each change of use or increase
in noise creates a new cause of action, makes it apparent that an ad-
vance in aircraft design involving more engines and noise per jet could
lead to a whole new round of actions. A conversion from jets to rockets
would be even more analogous to the present action, and in either in-
stance it would seem that the property owner's recovery would turn on
his ability to prove a resulting reduction in property value.97 This
view, while admittedly generous to individual property owners, would
be onerous to governmental entities that could be subjected to succes-
sive actions due to reasonable changes in use dictated by progress.
Particularly serious results could attend an extension of this concept
93 Cheskov v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wn2d 416, 421, 348 P.2d 673, 677 (1960) ("The
air is a public highway...."); Mills v. Orcas Power & Light Co., 56 Wn2d 807,
821-22, 355 P.2d 781, 789 (1960) ("An airplane... is privileged to travel this modem
highway.").
94 RCW 14.08 provides in part: "Where necessary, in order to provide unobstructed
air space for the landing and taking off of aircraft.., every municipality is authorized
to acquire ... easements through or other interests in air spaces over land or water...
and such other airport protection privileges as are necessary to insure safe approaches
to the landing areas of said airports...." RCW 14.08.030(3).
9549 U.S.C.A. § 1301(24) (Supp. 1961). It should be noted that on appeal the
Port of Seattle made a two-pronged attack on the lower court judgment, asserting
on the one hand that it was in error based on prior Washington eminent domain
decisions, and on the other that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958. This rather substantial and controversial federal ques-
tion has been ignored for the purposes of this comment
962 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.445 (3d ed. rev. 1963).
9 Several methods are used to convey the easement to the condemnor upon payment
of damages. RCW 820.090 provides for transfer by judgment or decree and recorda-
tion thereof. Other examples are found in three federal cases cited at note 58 supra.
The court in Davis merely declared a permanent air easement for the damages paid.
The Aaron decision specified a permanent easement above 400 feet. The court in the
Jensen case, perhaps recognizing the difficulties that could arise later, required the
property owners to execute deeds granting the government a perpetual easement for




to highways and other ground activities. These successive actions, when
coupled with a rejection of the substantial damages requirement, sug-
gest that the state and cities could spend more time defending inverse
condemnation suits than building highways, streets or airports.
Summary. Before attempting to predict what Martin could mean
if carried over to other governmental activities, it is almost essential to
summarize several key points. Although there is a certain amount of
vagueness, not only in what the court said, but in what it left unsaid, it
seems clear that several distinctions and practices in the Washington
law of eminent domain have been eliminated. A strict following of the
Martin decision should mean that in bringing a future inverse con-
demnation action there is (1) no clear necessity of distinguishing be-
tween the taking or damaging of a property right respecting the use
and enjoyment of land; (2) no clear requirement of a physical inva-
sion, technical trespass, or adjacent public activity as to that property
right; (3) no distinction between substantial interference and in-
cidental damaging of property; (4) an opportunity to purchase dam-
aged land at a depreciated price and recover again from the damager;
(5) accrual of a new cause of action with each subsequent injury to
property resulting from a change or increase of use; (6) possible
periodic acquistion of perscriptive rights against property which must
be analyzed and considered in determining the actual extent of damage
for each separate injury; and (7) no clearly applicable statute of
limitations as to these causes of action.
THE FUTURE: STEETS AND HIGHWAYS
A logical extension of the Martin decision could well invite a flood of
previously noncompensable claims, especially in conjunction with the
building of modern freeways or limited-access highways through met-
ropolitan areas, and with new types of municipal transportation. A
number of urban property owners, both residential and commercial,
may now have valid inverse condemnation actions against the state or
its agents93 for damages that can be proved under the holding of Martin
v. Port of Seattle. Consider these brief hypothetical situations.
When apartment owner X purchased his building it was in a quiet
residential neighborhood. Today he faces an access road and a Cy-
clone fence separating him from a two-story wall of concrete topped by
9 8 Political subdivisions of the state acquire powers of eminent domain by express
delegation from the legislature. Seattle v. State, 54 Wn2d 139, 338 P2d 126 (1959);
Tepley v. Summerlin, 46 Wn2d 504, 282 P.2d 827 (1955).
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a ten-lane highway. Nothing was "taken" from X in the traditional
sense, nor is he technically abutting on the freeway.99 The highway
department, when acquiring right of way, undoubtedly reasoned that
the damage would be the usual noncompensable "inconvenience and
loss of peace and quiet" referred to in Martin,"' and long supposed to
be the lot of those who live alongside highways. But X has lost many
tenents because of the constant flow of noisy traffic, the bright mercury-
vapor lights, and the loss of view. The highway side of his apartment
is largely vacant now, and X would sell and move except for the size-
able loss his realtor estimates he must take. This is exactly the meas-
ure of his claim under the Martin decision where it is suggested that
he may sell the property at its present fair market value and recover
his loss from the state.101
Homeowner Y has a similar problem. The quiet neighborhood street
that ran in front of his house is now a busy access road that causes his
wife great concern with regard to the children.' Here too is the loss
of view,' the constant noise of passing cars and trucks, the bright
lights, and the inconvenience of having to drive three miles to the
shopping center formerly only a two block trip.' All these factors
weigh heavily in determining the price Y may expect to get for his home,
09 RCW 47.52.080 protects, in theory, an abutter's right of access to a limited
access facility by requiring compensation when such access is taken. The question
really is, who is an "abutting owner" under the code? Current practice in acquiring
freeway rights of way would seem to entail a purchase up to the far side of an
existing street. The property owner continues to abut on the old street rather than
the freeway, and the fact that he cannot conveniently get on or across the freeway
is not compensable since he technically is not abutting.
100 64 Wn.2d at 333, 391 P.2d at 546.
0l1 See text accompanying note 111 infra.
102 Aubol v. City of Tacoma, 167 Wash. 442, 9 P.2d 780 (1932), considered the
question of anxiety and fear causing loss of property value. It was held there that a
showing of "reasonable apprehension of danger" was necessary, and recovery was
denied. Similarly, one of the many allegations by plaintiffs in the Martin case was
directed toward an element of the taking or damaging by jet flights through the
"anxiety" engendered by the loud noise. Brief of Respondents, pp. 15-16. However,
the individual consideration of these factors would now seem unimportant following
the Martin decision. The fear or anxiety of a mother for her children next to a busy
access road will be directly reflected in what a purchaser (with children) will pay
for the property, and this is the sole measure of damages.
103 The right to such intangibles as light, air and view, was a compensable element
of damage in earlier cases. See Fry v. O'Leary, 141 Wash. 465, 252 Pac. 111 (1925) ;
Keesling v. Seattle, 52 Wn.2d 247, 234 P.2d 806 (1958). In an inverse condemnation
it is now the bearing of such loss on the fair market value that is important.
104 One is not deprived of access if the highway is new since no access existed
before construction. State v. Calkins, 50 Wn.2d 716, 314 P.2d 449 (1957). There is a
parallel in the case of Caldwell v. Seattle, 75 Wash. 565, 135 Pac. 470 (1913), which
held that the complaining adjacent property owner had no protected right to enter
the city park at a particular spot, and could not complain that the entrance across
from his house had been made inaccessible. While such inconvenience would not
have been compensable before the Martin case, to the extent it is reflected in the
reduced market value of the property it will now be an element of recovery.
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and indeed, may even render finding a buyer difficult. It would appear
that Y's injury could now support an inverse condemnation under the
Martin case.
Representative of a third type of indirect property injury is the
businessman who is dependent on passing motorists for his livelihood.
Motel owners are a common example of this group," 5 although res-
taurants and other highway-oriented business activities are similarly
affected. As a rule their initial locations were selected on the basis of
traffic flow; today they find that either the motorists do not pass, or if
they do, they cannot get off the highway. From their loss of business
would follow a corresponding loss in value of the business and its situs,
and "in inverse condemnation the measure of recovery is injury to
market value, and that alone."'01
One example which is not hypothetical may be representative of the
municipal transportation liability of the future. As of June 19, 1964,
some twenty property owners and businesses abutting the Seattle
monorail route had filed actions totalling 1.6 million dollars against the
City of Seattle and the franchised monorail operators.'" These prop-
erty owners have, in general, alleged only a constitutional "taking or
damaging" which, in line with the Martin opinion, should be sufficient.
Though not attempting to prejudge the case, it would appear that the
plaintiffs' success of recovering must turn on an ability to show that
their properties today have less value than before the monorail was
constructed in the street.
There are many similar examples of property owners up and down
our streets, highways and freeways, who can conclusively show that
some nearby or adjacent governmental project has caused a reduction
in their property values. Former limitations on a constitutional taking
or damaging action such as the abutting requirement, the need to
show something more than mere depreciation of property value or
annoyance and inconvenience, dissuaded most property owners from
105 In Walker v. State, 48 Wn.2d 587, 295 P2d 328 (1956), a motel owner brought
an inverse condemnation action claiming a right to compensation for "diminution
of the right of ingress and egress" resulting from installation of a concrete divider in
the center of an abutting four-lane highway. The court found this to be the non-
compensable result of a valid exercise of police power, noting that a property
owner has a right of free and unhampered access to his property-but no property
right in the continued flow of traffic past that property. Here the court emphasized
that while traffic coming down the far side of the highway could no longer turn
across to complainant's motel the motorists could eventually return on the right
side of the road. Compare the recent handling of a similar complaint by a Minne-
sota motel owner in Hendrickson v. State, 127 N.W2d 165 (Minn. 1964).
106 64 Wn2d at 333, 391 P.2d at 546.
107 Argus, June 19, 1964, p. 4, col. 3.
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even bringing forth their claims. Legislation rendering acts done under
statutory authority immune from being a nuisance,"°8 the probability
that an asserted "public use" would be turned into an exercise of police
power for "public welfare,' 9 and a number of other limiting concepts
all contributed to keeping the courts clear of these claims. Yet these
people have had their property rights interfered with, albeit for the
greater public good. The state constitution offers a remedy, and the
Martin decision expressly states that "when the land of an individual
is diminished in value for the public benefit, then justice, and the
constitution, require that the public pay.""' The court even offers
the property owner a means by which he can establish the injury and
the amount of damage; he may simply sell his property at a loss and
move away, with a result no different than if the property had been
directly condemned. "Whichever way the state exacts such a 'sale' it
must pay the individual the amount he suffers in the diminishment of
the value of his land, as reflected by the decrease in the amount he
can receive in a sale to a willing buyer.""'
CONCLUSION
The equitable result in Martin as to private property owners cannot
be doubted. The court has cut away some overly technical distinctions
and limiting judicial verbiage that has, in the past, blocked fulfillment
of the express promise of article I, section 16 of the Washington
Constitution. In so doing, however, the court may subsequently find
that it has opened the way to actions and recoveries not envisioned
by the framers of the constitution, or perhaps even by the court itself.
Washington courts may now have some difficulty in drawing new lines,
if any lines are to be drawn, between recovery for necessary and legiti-
mate governmental activities and those projects categorized by the
constitution as "public uses."
It will be recalled that there are two versions of the ancient myth
108 "Nothing which is done or maintained under express authority of a statute can
be deemed a nuisance." RCW 7.48.160. But see Shields v. Spokane School District,
31 Wn2d 247, 196 P2d 352 (1948), interpreting the statute to mean only that it cannot
be a nuisance per se, and that the court may still find it a nuisance in fact.
109 See text accompanying note 11 supra. Compare Walker v. State, 48 Wn2d 587,
295 P2d 328 (1956), witlh McMoran v. State, 55 Wn.2d 37, 345 P2d 59& (1959).
That the valid exercise of "police power" will continue as an important escape route
from governmental liability has been borne out in two decisions coming after Martin:
Kahin v. City of Seattle, 64 Wn2d 886, 395 P2d 79 (1964); State v. Williams, 64
Wn2d 855, 394 P2d 693 (1964).




of Pandora and her magic box. In one the box contained all human
ills which escaped when the box was opened. In the other the box
was filled with all the blessings of the gods which likewise (except
for Hope) escaped.'12
It seems clear that the decision and opinion in Martin v. Port of
Seattle has, for the time being at least, opened a similar box filled with
all the various actionable claims of inverse condemnation. It may
well be that these too are blessings rather than ills, and perhaps the
court has intentionally released seventy-five years of express consti-
tutional claims, imprisoned one by one by an overly solicitous Wash-
ington court. RussELL A. AuSTIN, JR.
22 BumncH, MYcouxnr: TEE AGE or FAzLB 16-17 (comp. Modem Library).
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